Chiappinelli, OlgaSeres, Gyula2025-02-112025-02-112024-05-010165-1765https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218675We provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment.4 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Política ambientalContractes administratiusSubhastesPolítica de despesa públicaEnvironmental policyPublic contractsAuctionsGovernment spending policyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7488852025-02-11info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess