Llerena Garrés, FrancescNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)Rafels, Carles2017-02-092017-02-092015-020020-7276https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)15 p.application/pdfeng(c) Springer Verlag, 2015Teoria de jocsTeoria de conjuntsLògica matemàticaPresa de decisionsGame theorySet theoryMathematical logicDecision makinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6351632017-02-09info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess