García-Carpintero, Manuel2020-03-242021-08-042019-08-040021-8529https://hdl.handle.net/2445/153637In recent work, Kendall Walton has abandoned his very influential account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples allegedly showing that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. In this article, both in support and further elaboration of a constitutive‐norms speech‐act variation on Walton's account that I have defended previously, I critically discuss his objections. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, I provide additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis‐à‐vis institutional accounts like Walton's and Gricean speech‐act proposals.13 p.application/pdfeng(c) The American Society for Aesthetics , 2019FilosofiaTeoria de les ficcionsPhilosophyTheory of fictionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6902392020-03-24info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess