Atay, Ata2016-09-222016-09-2220161136-8365https://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)9 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay , 2016http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/Teoria de jocsAssignació de recursosÀlgebres de Von NeumannProblema de NeumannGame theoryResource allocationVon Neumann algebrasNeumann problemainfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper2016-09-22info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess