Revelli, Federico2017-09-272017-09-272013https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore.47 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Revelli, 2013http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Administració fiscalEleccions localsDescentralització administrativaTax administration and procedureLocal electionsDecentralization in governmentinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess