Curto Grau, MartaSolé Ollé, AlbertSorribas, Pilar2017-10-092017-10-092012https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116345We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the State incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources.44 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Curto Grau et al., 2012http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Partits políticsAdministració localEleccions localsRepresentació proporcionalPolítical partiesLocal governmentLocal electionsProportional representationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess