Llerena Garrés, FrancescRafels, Carles2011-09-052011-09-0520101136-8365https://hdl.handle.net/2445/19402We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.15 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Llerena, et al., 2010http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/EconometriaTeoria de jocsEconometricsGame theoryVon Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU gamesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess