Di Luca, CamillaIzquierdo Aznar, Josep MariaRafels, Carles2017-02-162017-02-162013-121545-2921https://hdl.handle.net/2445/107053We study a cooperative problem where agents contribute a certain amount of input in order to obtain a surplus. We assume that the average surplus with respect to the amount contributed is increasing. Within this basic model, a cooperative game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity. Finally, we provide a condition that guarantees that the proportional nucleolus coincides with the proportional solution.10 p.application/pdfeng(c) Di Luca, Camilla et al., 2013Teoria de jocsEquilibri (Economia)Competència econòmicaEconomia matemàticaGame theoryEquilibrium (Economics)CompetitionMathematical economicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6371132017-02-16info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess