Vives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963-Vila Cortijo, Esteve2024-05-242024-05-242024-01-17https://hdl.handle.net/2445/211820Treballs Finals del Doble Grau d'Administració i Direcció d'Empreses i de Matemàtiques, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa i Facultat de Matemàtiques i Informàtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2023-2024, Tutor: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia[en] The main goal of this work is to discuss the most relevant aspects regarding single-object auction theory. In particular, principal types of single-object auctions, equilibrium strategies for each type, and variations on the proposed model are disclosed. In order to accomplish these aims, a brief summary of basic terms on game theory is provided in first place so as to set the foundations of auction theory. This preliminary summary includes a series of key results on game theory, allowing to use them as a tool to apply into auction theory and thus understand the second part of the document. Finally, a real example of an auction type is provided: the U.S Treasury Bill auction. Definitions, mechanisms and bidding behaviour are provided, along with a brief introduction to multi-object auctions.49 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Esteve Vila Cortijo, 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/SubhastesDeute públicJocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)Treballs de fi de grauAuctionsPublic debtNoncooperative games (Mathematics)Bachelor's thesesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess