Daniele, Gianmarco2017-09-182017-09-182015https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.37 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Daniele, 2015http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Crim organitzatMàfiaPolíticsEleccionsOrganized crimeMafiaPoliticiansElectionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess