Soria-Ruiz, Andrés2025-01-022025-01-022023-09-010167-7411https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217264I argue against the view that metalinguistic usage is a form of conversational implicature. That view, suggested by Thomasson (Anal Philos 57(4):1-28, 2016) and Belleri (Philos Stud 174(9):2211–2226, 2017), has been most recently fleshed out by Mankowitz (Synthese 199:5603–5622, 2021). I provide two types of criticism to the implicature view. From an empirical point of view, metalinguistic usage differs in key respects from standard cases of conversational implicature. From a conceptual standpoint, I argue that the calculation algorithm provided by the implicature view makes undesirable predictions. Although my main objective is negative, I end the paper by sketching an alternative neo-Stalnakerian view of metalinguistic usage, that can be gathered from work by Barker (Linguist Philos 25(1):1–36, 2002; Inquiry 56(2–3):240–257, 2013) and others.12 p.application/pdfengcc-by (c) Soria-Ruiz, Andrés, 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Semàntica (Filosofia)Filosofia analíticaConsciència lingüísticaSemantics (Philosophy)Analysis (Philosophy)Language awarenessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article2025-01-02info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess