Hoefer, CarlViger, ChristopherViger, Daniel2020-06-192020-06-192019-12-010495-4548https://hdl.handle.net/2445/166337We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.15 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Hoefer, Carl et al., 2019http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esPresa de decisionsElecció (Psicologia)RaóDecision makingChoice (Psychology)ReasonNewcomb, William A.info:eu-repo/semantics/article6975702020-06-19info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess