García-Carpintero, Manuel2020-05-132020-05-1320190873-626Xhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/160057Singular terms used in fictions for fictional characters raise well-known philosophical issues, explored in depth in the literature. But philosophers typically assume that names already in use to refer to 'moderate-sized specimens of dry goods' cause no special problem when occurring in fictions, behaving there as they ordinarily do in straightforward assertions. In this paper I continue a debate with Stacie Friend, arguing against this for the exceptionalist view that names of real entities in fictional discourse don't work there as they do in simple-sentence assertions, but rather as fictional names do.35 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2019http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esAnàlisi del discursReferència (Filosofia)Discourse analysisReference (Philosophy)info:eu-repo/semantics/article6991022020-05-13info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess