Egger, PeterKoethenbuerger, MarcoSmart, Michael2017-10-202017-10-202010https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863The impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives.30 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Egger et al., 2010http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/EleccionsAdministració localFederalismeDret fiscalElectionsLocal governmentFederalismTax lawinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess