Vives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963-Batlle Masmiquel, Laura2022-09-052022-09-052022-06-13https://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2022, Director: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia[en] In this work we introduce the sealed-bid auction theory, and we compute its equilibrium when values are private and affiliated. Then we compare the seller’s expected revenue of first and second price auctions under different scenarios. Finally, we simulate an auction and check that the Revenue equivalence holds when values are uniformly distributed on [0,1].45 p.application/pdfcatcc-by-nc-nd (c) Laura Batlle Masmiquel, 2022http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Teoria de jocsTreballs de fi de grauSubhastesJocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)Mètodes de simulacióGame theoryBachelor's thesesAuctionsNoncooperative games (Mathematics)Simulation methodsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess