Atay, AtaNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)2020-02-192022-03-312019-030165-4896https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.5 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2019http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esAssignació de recursosCompetència econòmicaPresa de decisions (Estadística)Matemàtica financeraResource allocationCompetitionStatistical decisionBusiness mathematicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6852812020-02-19info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess