Gamalerio, Matteo2020-06-082023-06-302020-060176-2680https://hdl.handle.net/2445/164733Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. 'Civic Lists' in Italy). I exploit the success of 'Civic Lists' in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Alternative stories find less support in the data.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2020http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esPartits políticsDisciplina de partitResponsabilitat fiscalAdministració municipalItàliaPolitical partiesParty disciplineFiscal responsibilityMunicipal governmentItalyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7003792020-06-08info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess