Álvarez-Mozos, MikelEhlers, Lars2024-02-022024-02-022024-03-010165-4896https://hdl.handle.net/2445/207069In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.6 p.application/pdfengcc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)Estadística matemàticaGeometria algebraicaTeoria d'operadorsCooperative games (Mathematics)Mathematical statisticsAlgebraic geometryOperator theoryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7417262024-02-02info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess