Chirinko, Robert S.Wilson, Daniel J.2017-10-162017-10-162010https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent. We depart from this assumption by allowing policymakers to be influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses. Campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, we find that contributions have a significant direct effect on tax policy, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4, the slope of the tax reaction function is negative, and the empirical results are sensitive to state effects.44 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Chirinko et al., 2010http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Campanyes electoralsAnàlisi de dades de panelPolítica fiscalPolitical campaignsPanel analysisFiscal policyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess