Gamalerio, MatteoNegri, Margherita2023-07-182023-07-182023-07-011468-2702https://hdl.handle.net/2445/200815Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees' reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.20 p.application/pdfeng(c) Gamalerio, Matteo et al., 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Migració (Població)RefugiatsIncentius fiscalsEleccionsMigration (Population)RefugeesTax incentivesElectionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7305542023-07-18info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess