Atay, AtaSolymosi, Tamás2023-06-162023-06-162018-06-010165-1765https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).5 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/NegociacióJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)Teoria de jocsNegotiationCooperative games (Mathematics)Game theoryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7168412023-06-16info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess