Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)Vidal-Puga, Juan2020-11-232020-11-232020https://hdl.handle.net/2445/172298Stable cores in information graph games Abstract: In an information graph situation, some agents that are connected by an undirected graph can share with no cost some information or technology that can also be obtained from a source. If an agent is not connected to an informed player, this agent pays a unitary cost to obtain this technology. A coalitional cost game can be defined from this situation, and the core of this game is known to be non- empty. We prove that the core of an information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the graph is cycle- complete, or equivalently if the information graph game is concave. When the graph is not cycle-complete, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. In this regard, we show that if the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, then a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related information graph situation where one edge has been deleted.27 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Núñez et al., 2020http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Teoria de jocsTeoria de grafsÀlgebres de Von NeumannGame theoryVon Neumann algebrasGraph theoryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess