Anesi, VincentDonder, Philippe de2017-10-132017-10-132011https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116592We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate the minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and most prefers a government’s type that is biased in favor of the minority. We then propose a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to several parameters: the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to econòmic (centripetal) -as opposed to (centrifugal) ideological- factors, the relative size of the minority region, the (exogenous) probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences.35 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Anesi et al., 2011http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Autodeterminació nacionalEleccionsNational self-determinationElectionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess