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Title: Constrained multi-issue rationing problems
Author: Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria
Timoner Lledó, Pere
Keywords: Racionament del consum
Equilibri (Economia)
Competència econòmica
Equilibrium (Economics)
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco16/347]
Abstract: We study a variant of the multi-issue rationing model, where agents claim for several issues. In this variant, the available amount of resource intended for each issue is constrained to an amount fixed a priori according to exogenous criteria. The aim is to distribute the amount corresponding to each issue taking into account the allocation for the rest of issues (issue-allocation interdependence). We name these problems constrained multi-issue allocation situations (CMIA). In order to tackle the solution to these problems, we first reinterpret some single-issue egalitarian rationing rules as a minimization program based on the idea of finding the feasible allocation as close as possible to a specific reference point. We extend this family of egalitarian rules to the CMIA framework. In particular, we extend the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the reverse Talmud rule to the multi-issue rationing setting, which turn out to be particular cases of a family of rules, namely the extended α-egalitarian family. This family is analysed and characterized by using consistency principles (over agents and over issues) and a property based on the Lorenz dominance criterion.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/347
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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