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Title: | The philosophical significance of the De Se |
Author: | García-Carpintero, Manuel |
Keywords: | Subjectivitat Pensament Subjectivity Thinking |
Issue Date: | 24-Jan-2017 |
Publisher: | Oslo University Press |
Abstract: | Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new 'effect' - new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges - first and foremost, concerning action explanations - aiming to make the case that the 'De Se effect' is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003 |
It is part of: | Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 60, num. 3 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003 |
ISSN: | 0020-174X |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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667119.pdf | 1.72 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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