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Title: The philosophical significance of the De Se
Author: García-Carpintero, Manuel
Keywords: Subjectivitat
Issue Date: 24-Jan-2017
Publisher: Oslo University Press
Abstract: Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new 'effect' - new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges - first and foremost, concerning action explanations - aiming to make the case that the 'De Se effect' is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 60, num. 3
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ISSN: 0020-174X
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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