Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/106682
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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata-
dc.contributor.authorLlerena Garrés, Francesc-
dc.contributor.authorNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)-
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-09T07:37:39Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-31T23:01:41Z-
dc.date.issued2016-10-
dc.identifier.issn1134-5764-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/106682-
dc.description.abstractA generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25-26:71-79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.-
dc.format.extent22 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0-
dc.relation.ispartofTOP, 2016, vol. 24, num. 3, p. 572-593-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0-
dc.rights(c) Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2016-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)-
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursos-
dc.subject.classificationCompetència econòmica-
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisions (Estadística)-
dc.subject.classificationMatemàtica financera-
dc.subject.otherResource allocation-
dc.subject.otherCompetition-
dc.subject.otherStatistical decision-
dc.subject.otherBusiness mathematics-
dc.titleGeneralized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec662464-
dc.date.updated2017-02-09T07:37:39Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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