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Title: The bargaining set for almost-convex games
Author: Getán Oliván, Jesús
Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria
Montes, Jesús
Rafels, Carles
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Conjunts convexos
Funcions convexes
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
Game theory
Convex sets
Convex functions
Von Neumann algebras
Issue Date: Feb-2015
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: We generalize the well-known result of the coincidence of the bargaining set and the core for convex games (Maschler et al., 1972) to the class of games named almost-convex games, that is, coalitional games where all proper subgames are convex.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Annals of Operations Research, 2015, vol. 225, num. 1, p. 83-89
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ISSN: 0254-5330
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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