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dc.contributor.authorUreña Martínez, Rubén-
dc.descriptionTreballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2017, Director: F. Javier Martínez de Albénizca
dc.description.abstractThis degree project studies the main results on the bilateral assignment game. This is a part of cooperative game theory and models a market with indivisibilities and money. There are two sides of the market, let us say buyers and sellers, or workers and firms, such that when we match two agents from different sides, a profit is made. We show some good properties of the core of these games, such as its non-emptiness and its lattice structure. There are two outstanding points: the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, in which all agents of one sector get their best possible outcome. We also study a related non-cooperative mechanism, an auction, to implement the buyers-optimal core
dc.format.extent57 p.-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Rubén Ureña Martínez, 2017-
dc.subject.classificationJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)-
dc.subject.classificationTreballs de fi de grau-
dc.subject.classificationJocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)ca
dc.subject.classificationOptimització matemàticaca
dc.subject.otherCooperative games (Mathematics)-
dc.subject.otherBachelor's thesis-
dc.subject.otherNoncooperative games (Mathematics)en
dc.subject.otherMathematical optimizationen
dc.titleAn essay on assignment gamesca
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

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