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Title: When politics and lobbyism combine to promote white elephants by using PPPs
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Gragera Lladó, Albert
Keywords: Infraestructures (Transport)
Anàlisi d'impacte (Política governamental)
Transportation buildings
Impact analysis (Public administration)
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-IR18/23]
Abstract: Theoretical insights into the cooperation between public and private partners (PPPs) suggest that they can be an effective tool for preventing ‘white elephant’ type projects. However, various case studies have shown that this belief is largely dependent on the effective transfer of operational risk to the private partner, and on the application of user-pay funding. This paper goes one step further and explores the idea that private partners that participate in PPPs with no substantial risk transfer – and under heavily subsidized schemes – can act as lobbies, exerting pressure to develop white elephants.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2018, IR18/23
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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