Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/146689
Title: An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players
Author: Castañer, Anna
Marín Solano, Jesús
Ribas Marí, Carme
Keywords: Jocs diferencials
Equilibri (Economia)
Simetria (Matemàtica)
Dinàmica
Differential games
Equilibrium (Economics)
Symmetry (Mathematics)
Dynamics
Issue Date: Jan-2020
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Abstract: We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which players can bargain again at every future moment. By choosing as threat point the feedback noncooperative outcome, the corresponding solution, if it exists, is agreeable. An exhaustible resource game illustrates the results.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.004
It is part of: Operations Research Letters, 2020, vol. 48, num. 1, p. 4-8
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/146689
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.004
ISSN: 0167-6377
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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