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Title: One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands: core and competitive equilibrium
Author: Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Keywords: Agents comercials
Economia de mercat
Models economètrics
Equilibri (Economia)
Commercial agents
Market economy
Econometric models
Equilibrium (Economics)
Issue Date: Jun-2019
Publisher: Wiley
Abstract: We consider an assignment market with one seller who owns several indivisible heterogeneous goods and many buyers each willing to buy up to a given capacity. In this market, the core contains the Vickrey payoff vector. However, core allocations may not be supported by competitive equilibrium prices, even in a finite replication of the market. We first characterize the convexity of the associated coalitional game and we show that it is a sufficient condition so that the buyers‐optimal core allocation is competitive. With respect to the seller‐optimal core allocation, we provide a characterization of competitiveness by means of buyers' valuations. In addition, we characterize in terms of the valuation matrix the coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: International Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 15, num. 2, p. 169-182
Related resource:
ISSN: 1742-7355
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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