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Title: Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points
Author: Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
Rafels, Carles
Ybern, Neus
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
Issue Date: Mar-2020
Publisher: Elsevier
Abstract: We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, num. March, p. 144-153
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ISSN: 0899-8256
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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