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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635| Title: | Jocs amb informació incompleta: jocs bayesians i subhastes |
| Author: | Batlle Masmiquel, Laura |
| Director/Tutor: | Vives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963- |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Treballs de fi de grau Subhastes Jocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica) Mètodes de simulació Game theory Bachelor's theses Auctions Noncooperative games (Mathematics) Simulation methods |
| Issue Date: | 13-Jun-2022 |
| Abstract: | [en] In this work we introduce the sealed-bid auction theory, and we compute its equilibrium when values are private and affiliated. Then we compare the seller’s expected revenue of first and second price auctions under different scenarios. Finally, we simulate an auction and check that the Revenue equivalence holds when values are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. |
| Note: | Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2022, Director: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635 |
| Appears in Collections: | Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tfg_batlle_masmiquel_laura.pdf | Memòria | 742.27 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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