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Title: | Axioms for optimal stable rules and fair division rules in a multiple-partners job market |
Author: | Domènech i Gironell, Gerard Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) |
Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Estadística matemàtica Assignació de recursos Mercat de treball Game theory Mathematical statistics Resource allocation Labor market |
Issue Date: | Nov-2022 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Abstract: | In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm-covariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005 |
It is part of: | Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 136, num. 136, p. 469-484 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/192490 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005 |
ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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