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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460| Title: | An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game |
| Author: | Atay, Ata |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
| Issue Date: | 1-May-2017 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
| Abstract: | Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002. |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001 |
| It is part of: | Operations Research Letters, 2017, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 217-219 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001 |
| ISSN: | 0167-6377 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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