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Title: Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Perdiguero, Jordi
Keywords: Autopistes
Política de transports
Infraestructures (Transport)
Política industrial
Express highways
Transportation and state
Transportation buildings
Industrial policy
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Series/Report no: [WP E-IR12/18]
Abstract: Regulatory and funding asymmetries in the Spanish motorway network produce huge differences in the structure of gasoline markets by motorway type: free or toll. While competition is encouraged among gas stations on free motorways, the regulations for toll motorways allow private concessionaires to auction all gas stations to the same provider, thereby limiting competition and consolidating market power. This paper reports how this regulatory asymmetry results in higher prices and fewer gas stations. Specifically, we show that competition is constrained on toll motorways by the granting of geographical monopolies, resulting in a small number of rivals operating in close proximity to each other, and allowing gas stations to operate as local monopolies. The lack of competition would seem to account for the price differential between toll and free motorways. According to available evidence, deregulation measures affecting toll motorway concessions could help to mitigate price inefficiencies and increase consumer welfare.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2012, IR12/18
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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