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Title: Ownership, Incentives and Hospitals
Author: Fageda, Xavier, 1975-
Fiz Querol, Eva
Keywords: Gestió hospitalària
Economia de la salut
Control de qualitat de l'assistència mèdica
Hospital administration
Medical economics
Quality control of medical care
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Series/Report no: [WP E-IR10/12]
Abstract: This article analyzes hospital privatization by comparing costs and quality between different ownership forms. We put the attention on the distinction between public hospitals and private hospitals with public funding. Using information about Spanish hospitals, we have found that private hospitals provide services at a lower cost at expenses of lower quality. We observe that property rights theory is fulfilled at least for the Spanish hospital market. The way that Heath Authorities finance publicly funded hospitals may be responsible for the differences in incentives between public and private centers. We argue that the trade-off between costs and quality could be minimized by designing financing contracts with fixed and variable components.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2010, IR10/12
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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