Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/66929
Title: Strong versus Weak Vertical Integration: Contractual Choice and PPPs in the United States
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Geddes, R. Richard
Keywords: Integració vertical
Privatització
Empreses públiques
Cooperació empresarial
Projecte d'empresa
Vertical Integration
Privatization
Government business enterprises
Enterprise cooperation
Business planning
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
Abstract: Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2015/201518.pdf
It is part of: IREA – Working Papers, 2015, IR18/015
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/66929
ISSN: 2014-1254
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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