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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/112646
Title: | Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy |
Author: | Galletta, Sergio |
Keywords: | Màfia Corrupció Itàlia Mafia Corruption Italy |
Issue Date: | 2016 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB16/01] |
Abstract: | In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2016/01 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/112646 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB16-01_Galletta.pdf | 2.31 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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