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Title: | Fiscal equalization under political pressures |
Author: | Esteller Moré, Alejandro Galmarini, Umberto Rizzo, Leonzio |
Keywords: | Política fiscal Impostos Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat) Fiscal policy Taxation Distribution (Probability theory) |
Issue Date: | 2015 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB15/21] |
Abstract: | We examine the design of fiscal equalization transfers aimed at interregional redistribution in a setting in which special interest groups distort the fiscal policies of local governments. Equity always calls for tax-base equalization while efficiency calls for tax-base equalization of fiscal capacities backed by strong lobby groups and for taxrevenue equalization of those backed by weak lobby groups. Hence, it is optimal to rely only on tax-base equalization if the special interest groups are similar in terms of lobbying power, whereas a mixed system is optimal if they are highly heterogeneous. Tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base, while tax exporting that of tax-revenue, fiscal equalization. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2015/21 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115376 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB15-21_EstellerMore.pdf | 1.25 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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