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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Daniele, Gianmarco | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-09-18T06:25:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-09-18T06:25:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 37 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2015/37 | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Daniele, 2015 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Crim organitzat | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Màfia | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Polítics | - |
dc.subject.classification | Eleccions | cat |
dc.subject.other | Organized crime | eng |
dc.subject.other | Mafia | eng |
dc.subject.other | Politicians | - |
dc.subject.other | Elections | eng |
dc.title | Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB15-37_Daniele.pdf | 1.66 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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