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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Revelli, Federico | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-09-27T11:02:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-09-27T11:02:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 47 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2013/29 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB13/29] | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Revelli, 2013 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Administració fiscal | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Eleccions locals | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Descentralització administrativa | cat |
dc.subject.other | Tax administration and procedure | eng |
dc.subject.other | Local elections | eng |
dc.subject.other | Decentralization in government | eng |
dc.title | Tax limits and local democracy | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB13-29_Revelli.pdf | 1.86 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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