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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116311
Title: | The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets |
Author: | Mantovani, Andrea Vandekerckhove, Jan |
Keywords: | Fusió d'empreses Mercat financer Dret de la competència Consolidation and merger of corporations Financial market Antitrust law |
Issue Date: | 2012 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB12/10] |
Abstract: | In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2012/10 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116311 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB12-10_Mantovani.pdf | 638.85 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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