Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116345
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Curto Grau, Marta | - |
dc.contributor.author | Solé Ollé, Albert | - |
dc.contributor.author | Sorribas, Pilar | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-09T11:17:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-09T11:17:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116345 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the State incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources. | cat |
dc.format.extent | 44 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2012/31 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB12/31] | cat |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Curto Grau et al., 2012 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Partits polítics | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Administració local | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Eleccions locals | - |
dc.subject.classification | Representació proporcional | cat |
dc.subject.other | Polítical parties | eng |
dc.subject.other | Local government | eng |
dc.subject.other | Local elections | - |
dc.subject.other | Proportional representation | eng |
dc.title | Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain [WP-IEB] | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
IEB12-31_CurtoGrau.pdf | 682 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License