Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116363
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dc.contributor.authorRizzo, Leonzio-
dc.contributor.authorZanardi, Alberto-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-09T12:47:51Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-09T12:47:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/116363-
dc.description.abstractWe use data for all Italian municipalities, from 2001-2006, to empirically test the extent to which two electoral rules, which hold, for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single ballot plurality rule while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected.ca
dc.format.extent35 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions-
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2012/33-
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IEB12/33]cat
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Rizzo et al., 2012-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/-
dc.sourceIEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers-
dc.subject.classificationEleccions localscat
dc.subject.classificationFederalismecat
dc.subject.classificationImpostos-
dc.subject.otherLocal electionseng
dc.subject.otherFederalismeng
dc.subject.otherTaxation-
dc.titleSingle vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from Italyca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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