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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116365
Title: | Teacher quality policy when supply matters |
Author: | Rothstein, Jesse |
Keywords: | Qualitat de l'ensenyament Professors Avaluació educativa Política salarial Educational quality Teachers Educational evaluation Wage policy |
Issue Date: | 2012 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB12/35] |
Abstract: | Recent proposals would strengthen the dependence of teacher pay and retention on performance, in order to attract those who will be effective teachers and repel those who will not. I model the teacher labor market, incorporating dynamic self-selection, noisy performance measurement, and Bayesian learning. Simulations indicate that labor market interactions are important to the evaluation of alternative teacher contracts. Typical bonus policies have very small effects on selection. Firing policies can have larger effects, if accompanied by substantial salary increases. However, misalignment between productivity and measured performance nearly eliminates the benefits while preserving most of the costs. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2012/35 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116365 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB12-35_Rothstein.pdf | 1.01 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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