Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116578
Title: | Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory |
Author: | Piolatto, Amedeo Trotin, Gwenola |
Keywords: | Frau fiscal Impostos sobre la renda Control de gestió Tax evasion Income tax Management audit |
Issue Date: | 2011 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB11/29] |
Abstract: | Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most credited alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper characterises the optimal income tax and audit schemes under tax evasion, when taxpayers behave as predicted by PT. Under reasonable assumptions on the reference income and on the utility function of taxpayers, we show that the optimal audit probability function is non-increasing and the optimal tax function is non-decreasing and concave. The conditions under which those results hold for PT are weaker than the corresponding one for EUT. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2011/29 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116578 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
IEB11-29_Piolatto.pdf | 1.03 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License