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Title: | Estimating the rivalness of state-level inward FDI |
Author: | Brülhart, Marius Schmidheiny, Kurt |
Keywords: | Descentralització administrativa Dret fiscal Matemàtica financera Decentralization in government Tax law Business mathematics |
Issue Date: | 2011 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB11/36] |
Abstract: | Decentralized fiscal decision making is more likely to be optimal if regional tax bases are non-rival, in the sense that one region's gain is no other relevant region's loss. We develop a method for estimating the rivalness of tax bases using the underlying structures of the conditional logit, Poisson and nested logit models. We use this method to estimate the effect of state-level capital taxation on U.S. inward foreign direct investment. While the results are rather noisy, the assumption of perfect non-rivalenss can in some cases be rejected, but the assumption of perfect rivalness cannot. Competition over FDI across U.S. states may well be a zero-sum game. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2011/36 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116586 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB11-36_Brulhart.pdf | 484.91 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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