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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116592
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Anesi, Vincent | - |
dc.contributor.author | Donder, Philippe de | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-13T13:46:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-13T13:46:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116592 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate the minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and most prefers a government’s type that is biased in favor of the minority. We then propose a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to several parameters: the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to econòmic (centripetal) -as opposed to (centrifugal) ideological- factors, the relative size of the minority region, the (exogenous) probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 35 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2011/40 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB11/40] | cat |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Anesi et al., 2011 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Autodeterminació nacional | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Eleccions | cat |
dc.subject.other | National self-determination | eng |
dc.subject.other | Elections | eng |
dc.title | Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB11-40_Anesi.pdf | 341.49 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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