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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116760
Title: | How do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism? Tax vs. expenditure optimization |
Author: | Koethenbuerger, Marco |
Keywords: | Federalisme Dret fiscal Administració local Federalism Tax law Local government |
Issue Date: | 2010 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB10/29] |
Abstract: | Previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local públic finance while expenditures adjust residually. This paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable. In particular, it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments influences the way local governments decide on public policy. Unlike the presumption, the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures. The result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local taxation. The results offer a new perspective of the efficiency implications of federal policy toward local governments and, thereby, enable a more precise characterization of local government behaviour in fiscal federalism. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2010/29 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116760 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB10-29_Koethenbuerger.pdf | 480.99 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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